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mg2190@columbia.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Is the central bank’s objective best achieved by a policy that responds to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation or
the price level? This remains an open question that has regained attention recently among central
banks, such as the Bank of Canada which is about to renew its “inﬂation targeting” mandate.
Several early studies have found that it is preferable for the interest rate to respond to inﬂation
ﬂuctuations than to price-level ﬂuctuations in order to minimize the short-run variability of inﬂation
and output (e.g., Lebow et al., 1992; Haldane and Salmon, 1995). The intuition for this result is
simple: in the face of an unexpected temporary rise in inﬂation, price-level targeting requires
the policymaker to bring inﬂation below the target in subsequent periods. With nominal rigidities,
ﬂuctuations in inﬂa t i o nr e s u l ti nt u r ni nﬂuctuations in output. In contrast, with inﬂation targeting,
the drift in the price level is accepted: bygones are bygones. Price-level targeting is a “bad idea”
according to this conventional view because it would “add unnecessary short term ﬂuctuations to
the economy” (Fischer, 1994, p. 282), while it would only provide a small gain in long-term price
predictability in the US (McCallum, 1999).
However, when agents are forward-looking, it is highly desirable for policy to be history-
dependent, as explained in Woodford (2003a,b). Committing to a monetary policy of this kind
allows the central bank to aﬀect the private sector’s expectations appropriately, hence to improve
the performance of monetary policy. This suggests that past deviations of the inﬂation rate should
not be treated as bygones.
In this paper, we consider a basic forward-looking New Keynesian model in which the social
welfare loss function depends on the variability of inﬂation, the output gap and the interest rate.1
We seek to determine whether it is best for policy to respond to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation or in
the price level in this model, by comparing the properties of simple interest-rate rules. Simple
monetary policy rules are often prescribed as useful guides for the conduct of monetary policy.
Most prominently, a commitment to a Taylor rule (after Taylor, 1993) – according to which the
short-term policy rate responds to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and some measure of the output gap
– is known to yield a good welfare performance a large class of models (see, e.g., papers collected
in Taylor, 1999a; Taylor and Williams, 2010). We thus compare the performance of such Taylor
rules to that of so-called Wicksellian rules according to which the short-term policy rate depends
1This objective function can be viewed as a quadratic approximation to the underlying representative agent’s
expected utility.
1on deviations of the price level from a trend and the output gap.2
In our model, as in Woodford (2003a), Goodfriend and King (2001) and Kahn, King and
Wolman (2003), optimal policy – i.e., the policy that minimizes the assumed social welfare loss
function subject to the restrictions imposed by the modelled private sector behavior – involves
strong price-level stabilization, though it requires some drift of the price level in the face of some
shocks. Wicksellian rules perform however very well in terms of welfare by introducing a desirable
amount of history dependence in policy. In fact, we show that Wicksellian rules perform better than
optimal Taylor rules in our model. Under price-level stabilization, forward-looking agents expect
relatively low inﬂation in subsequent periods in the face of a temporary increase in inﬂation, as they
understand that the policymaker will have to bring inﬂation below trend. This in turn dampens the
initial increase in inﬂation, lowers the variability of inﬂation and welfare losses.3 While Williams
(2003) ﬁnds a similar result by simulating the large-scale FRB/US model under alternative simple
interest-rate rules when assuming rational expectations, our analysis of a simple macroeconomic
model – yet a model that incorporates key tradeoﬀs faced by policymakers – allows us to derive a
number of analytical results that provide a clear intuition about the welfare implications of simple
Taylor rules and Wicksellian rules, and their sensitivity to various assumptions.4
In addition, while simple Taylor rules are often argued to be robust to various types of model
2Wicksellian rules are named after Wicksell (1907) who argued that “price stability” could be obtained by letting
the interest rate respond positively to ﬂuctuations in the price level.
3It is important to note that the inﬂation rate used in much of John Taylor’s work (e.g., in Taylor, 1993) is a
moving average of past quarterly inﬂation rates, so that his proposed rule incorporates in fact some degree of history
dependence. To understand the role of history dependence introduced by the price level, we consider here "Taylor
rules" that involve only the contemporaneous inﬂation rate.
4We assume that the central bank is able to credibly commit to a policy rule for the entire future, so as to achieve
a better performance of monetary policy. Another branch of the literature assumes instead that the policymaker
cannot commit but that it acts under full discretion. These studies generally compare the eﬀects of a regime in which
the policymaker is assigned a loss function that involves inﬂation variability (called inﬂation targeting), to a regime in
which the loss function involves price-level variability (price-level targeting). Svensson (1999), Dittmar et al. (1999),
and Cecchetti and Kim (2004) show that when the perturbations to output are suﬃciently persistent, price-level
targeting results in lower inﬂation variability than inﬂation targeting. (However under commitment, Svensson (1999)
obtains the conventional result that price-level targeting is responsible for a higher variability of inﬂation.) While
these authors use a Neoclassical Phillips curve or a backward-looking model, Vestin (2006), and Dittmar and Gavin
(2000) show that these results hold also in a simple “New Keynesian” model. Speciﬁcally, they show that when the
central bank acts under discretion, price-level targeting results in a more favorable trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and
output gap variability relative to inﬂation targeting, even when perturbations to output are not persistent.
2misspeciﬁcations (Levin, Williams and Wieland, 1999; Levin and Williams, 2003), we show that
their welfare performance can however be very sensitive to the particular assumptions made about
the shock processes. Instead, Wicksellian rules are more robust to alternative shock processes.
Speciﬁcally, we show that (i) optimized coeﬃcients of simple Taylor rules depend critically on the
assumed degree of persistence of exogenous disturbances; (ii) such optimized Taylor rules result
in an indeterminate equilibrium for some parameter conﬁgurations; (iii) the welfare performance
relative to the ﬁrst best deteriorates sharply in the event that the economy is hit by shocks with a
higher persistence than the typical historical shocks. In contrast, optimized Wicksellian rules (i) are
less sensitive to the assumed shock persistence, (ii) generally result in a determinate equilibrium,
and (iii) maintain a very good welfare performance in the face of changes in shock processes or in
the face of misspeciﬁed shocks.
This sensitivity of optimized simple Taylor rules is arguably undesirable to the extent that in
practice central banks may not want to commit to policy rules that perform well only in the face
of a few typical shocks, as they may not be able to conceive at the time of commitment all possible
shocks that will aﬀect the economy in the future. Policymakers might thus be more inclined to
commit to a rule that is robust to the statistical properties of the exogenous disturbances.
As shown in Giannoni and Woodford (2003a,b, 2010), it is possible under general conditions
to derive a robustly optimal rule that implements the optimal equilibrium and that is completely
independent of the speciﬁcation of the exogenous shock processes. We report this rule here for the
model considered and argue that it is a close cousin of the simple Wicksellian rule augmented with a
large amount of interest-rate inertia. This latter rule remains extremely simple and introduces about
the right amount of history dependence, regardless of the persistence of exogenous disturbances.
Such a rule should thus be particularly appealing to policymakers who search for simple rules but
worry about unforeseeable circumstances (shocks) aﬀecting the economy in the future.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the model used in our analysis.
Section 3 characterizes the optimal plan. Section 4 determines simple optimal Taylor rules and
discusses their properties. Section 5 derives simple optimal Wicksellian rules and compare their
implications to optimal Taylor rules and the optimal plan, in terms of their dynamic responses
to disturbances, their welfare implications, the sensitivity of the optimal policy coeﬃcients to the
degree of persistence in the exogenous disturbances. Section 6 introduces interest-rate inertia. It
ﬁrst presents a simple rule that implements the optimal equilibrium and that is robust to the spec-
iﬁcation of the process of exogenous disturbances, and then argues that it resembles a Wicksellian
3rules with a large degree of interest-rate inertia. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Simple Structural Model
We consider a variant of the simple New Keynesian model that has been widely used in recent
studies of monetary policy, following Goodfriend and King (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997),
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), and Woodford (2003a,b).
2.1 Structural equations
The behavior of the private sector is summarized by two structural equations, an intertemporal IS
equation and a New Keynesian aggregate supply equation.5 The intertemporal IS equation, which
relates spending decisions to the interest rate, is given by
yt − gt =E t (yt+1 − gt+1) − σ−1 (it − Etπt+1), (1)
where yt denotes the log of (detrended) real output, πt is the quarterly inﬂation rate, it is the
nominal interest rate (all three variables expressed in deviations from their values in a steady-
state with zero inﬂation and constant output growth), and gt is an exogenous variable representing
autonomous variation in spending such as government spending. This equation can be obtained by
performing a log-linear approximation to the representative household’s Euler equation for optimal
timing of expenditures, using the market clearing condition on the goods market. The parameter
σ>0 represents the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. As we will also be
interested in describing the evolution of the log of the price level pt, we note that by deﬁnition of
inﬂation, we have
pt = πt + pt−1. (2)
It is assumed that prices are sticky, as in Calvo (1983), and that suppliers are in monopolistic
competition. It follows that a log-linear approximation to the ﬁrst-order condition for the suppliers’
optimal price-setting decisions yields the familiar New Keynesian supply equation
πt = κ(yt − yn
t )+βEtπt+1, (3)
where κ>0 depends on the speed of price adjustment, β ∈ (0,1) denotes the discount factor of
the representative household, and yn
t represents the natural rate of output, i.e., the equilibrium
5Derivations of the structural equations from ﬁrst principles can be found, e.g., in Woodford (2003a, chap. 3).
4rate of output under perfectly ﬂexible prices. This natural rate of output is a composite exogenous
variable that may depend on a variety of perturbations such as productivity shocks, shifts in labor
supply, but also ﬂuctuations in government expenditures and shifts in preferences. We also allow




t is the rate of output that would maximize the representative household’s welfare in the
absence of distortions. Fluctuations in ye
t − yn
t could be due, e.g., to exogenous variation in the
degree of market power of ﬁrms or in distortionary taxation. As we will evaluate monetary policy
in terms of deviations of output from the eﬃcient rate, it will be convenient to deﬁne the “output
gap” as
xt ≡ yt − ye
t.
We can then rewrite the structural equations (1) and (3) as
xt =E txt+1 − σ−1 (it − Etπt+1 − re
t) (4)
πt = κxt + βEtπt+1 + ut, (5)














t denotes the “eﬃcient” rate of interest, i.e., the equilibrium real interest rate that would
prevail in the absence of distortions.
2.2 Shock processes
We think of the composite shocks re
t and ut as being functions of a potentially large number of
underlying disturbances, with each of the underlying disturbance having a diﬀerent degree of persis-
tence. We assume that the central bank knows perfectly the shocks that have hit the economy until
the present, but may not be able to assess the realization of all possible future shocks. Following
Giannoni and Woodford (2003a), we let the shocks re
t and ut be composites of an inﬁnity of types
























5where εk,t, and ˆ εk,m,t are iid, mean-zero random variables, for all k ∈ {r,u} and m,t ≥ 0, but
where the innovations ˆ εk,m,t have a distribution with a large atom at zero, and the parameters
ρk,ˆ ρk ∈ [0,1) determine the persistence of each of these innovations. The composite shocks re
t and
ut are thus aﬀected in each period by typical innovations εr,t and εu,t, with a persistence given by
ρr,ρ u, a n dt h e ym a yb ei n f r e q u e n t l ya ﬀected by a large number of other types of unforecastable
disturbances, ˆ εr,m,t and ˆ εu,m,t each of which may have a diﬀerent degree of persistence. To simplify
the analysis, we furthermore assume that such infrequent innovations have not been observed in
the past, up to the date 0 at which the policymaker will set policy, so that the historical exogenous
processes can be correctly characterized by stationary AR(1) processes
re
t = ρrre
t−1 + εrt (8)
ut = ρuut−1 + εut. (9)







for all t ≥ 0. Since it is impractical for the central bank to catalog all of the possible disturbances
ˆ εr,m,t, ˆ εr,m,t before they are realized, and since the policymaker cannot reject the hypothesis that
the past shocks and conditional forecasts of future shocks are described by (8)—(11), we assume that
the central bank wants to choose at date 0 a rule that would be optimal (at least within the class
of rules that it considers) under the assumption that the shock processes are given by (8)—(9).6
2.3 Policy objective









t + λx (xt − x∗)




where λx,λ i > 0 are weights placed on the stabilization of the output gap and the nominal interest
rate, β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor mentioned above, and where x∗ ≥ 0 and i∗ represent some
6The central bank does not need to regard it as certain that (8)—(9) are correct. However, we assume that it
will only consider rules that would be optimal in the case that (8)—(9) were correct. Subject to that requirement,
we assume that it would also like its rule to be as robust as possible to alternative shock processes within the more
general family (6)—(7).
6optimal levels of the output gap and the nominal interest rate. The expectation E[·] is conditional
on the state of the economy at the time that the policy is evaluated, which we assume takes place
before the realization of the shocks at that date. This loss criterion can be viewed as a second-
order Taylor approximation to the lifetime utility function of the representative household in the
underlying model (see Woodford, 2003a, chap. 6). The concern for interest rate variability in (12)
reﬂects both welfare costs of transactions and an approximation to the zero lower bound on nominal
interest rates. The approximation of the utility function allows us furthermore to determine the
relative weights λx,λ i, and the parameters x∗,i ∗ in terms of the parameters of the underlying
model.7
The ineﬃcient supply shock is responsible for a trade-oﬀ between the stabilization of inﬂation
on one hand, and the output gap on the other hand. Indeed, in the face of an increase in ut, the
policymaker could completely stabilize the output gap by letting inﬂation move appropriately, or
he could stabilize inﬂation, by letting the output gap decrease by the right amount, but he could
not keep both inﬂation and the output gap constant. By how much he will let inﬂation and the
output gap vary depends ultimately on the weight λx. In the absence of ineﬃcient supply shocks,
however, both inﬂation and the output gap could be completely stabilized by letting the interest
rate track the path of the eﬃcient rate of interest, re
t (which incidentally is equal to the natural
rate of interest in the absence of ineﬃcient supply shocks, as ye
t = yn
t ). But when λi > 0 in (12),
welfare costs associated to ﬂuctuations in the nominal interest rate introduce a tension between
stabilization of inﬂation and the output gap on one hand and stabilization of the nominal interest
rate on the other hand.
2.4 Calibration
In the rest of the paper, we characterize optimal monetary policy for arbitrary positive values of
the parameters. At times however we focus on a particular parametrization of the model, using
the parameter values estimated by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) for the U.S. economy, and
7Woodford (2003a, chap. 6)’s derivation of the loss criterion from ﬁrst principles accounts for transaction frictions
and the approximation of the lower bound on interest rates, but abstracts from ineﬃcients supply shocks ut.T h e
welfare function (12) remains a valid approximation of the underlying utility in the presence of ineﬃcient supply shocks
to the extent that we consider only small deviations from the eﬃcient steady state, and evaluate all derivatives at
that steady state.
7summarized in Table 1.8 The weights λx and λi are calibrated as in Woodford (2003a), using
the calibrated structural parameters and the underlying microeconomic model. Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) provide estimated time-series for the disturbances yn
t and gt. They do however
not split the series for the natural rate of output in an eﬃcient component ye
t, and an ineﬃcient
component. For simplicity, we calibrate the variance of re
t by assuming that all shifts in the
aggregate supply equation are eﬃcient shifts, so that the variance of the eﬃcient rate of interest
is the same as the variance of the natural rate of interest reported in Woodford (2003a). In our
benchmark calibration, we set var (ut) to its upper bound κ2 var (yn
t ), assuming that all shifts in
the aggregate supply equation are due to ineﬃcient shocks. We however verify that our conclusions
are not sensitive to alternative calibrations of var (ut).
3O p t i m a l P l a n
Before evaluating alternative policies below, it will be useful to consider as a benchmark the opti-
mal state-contingent plan. This plan characterizes the optimal stochastic processes of endogenous
variables {πt,x t,i t}, i.e., those that minimize the unconditional expectation of the loss criterion
(12) subject to the constraints (4) and (5) imposed by the private sector’s behavior at all dates,
assuming that the policymaker can commit to the plan for the entire future.9 Following Currie and











t + λx (xt − x∗)





xt − xt+1 + σ−1 (it − πt+1 − re
t)
¤
+ φ2t [πt − κxt − βπt+1 − ut]
¢ª
. (13)
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions with respect to πt,x t, and it are
πt − (βσ)
−1 φ1t−1 + φ2t − φ2t−1 =0 (14)
λx (xt − x∗)+φ1t − β−1φ1t−1 − κφ2t =0 (15)
λi (it − i∗)+σ−1φ1t =0 (16)
8While the econometric model of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) is more sophisticated than the present model,
their structural equations correspond to (1) and (3) when conditioned upon information available two quarters earlier
in their model.
9This section generalizes slightly the results of Clarida et al. (1999), and Woodford (2003a, 2003b) who consider
the optimal plan either in the presence of ineﬃcient supply shocks, or with a concern of interest-rate stabilization
(λi > 0), but not both at the same time.
8at each date t ≥ 0, and for each possible state. In addition, we have the initial conditions
φ1,−1 = φ2,−1 =0 (17)
indicating that the policymaker has no previous commitment at time 0.
The optimal plan is a bounded solution {πt,x t,i t,φ 1t,φ 2t}
∞
t=0 to the system of equations (4),
(5), (14) — (16) at each date t ≥ 0, and for each possible state, together with the initial conditions
(17). To characterize the optimal responses to perturbations, we rewrite the equations above in
terms of deviations from the optimal steady-state: ˆ πt ≡ πt − πop, ˆ xt ≡ xt − xop, ˆ ıt ≡ it − iop, and
ˆ pt ≡ pt − p
op
t .10 We note that the same equations (4), (5), (14) — (16), and (2) hold now in terms
of the hatted variables, but without the constant terms. Using (16) to substitute for the interest











⎦ + met, (18)
where ˆ qt ≡ [ˆ πt, ˆ xt]
0 , ˆ φt ≡
h
ˆ φ1t, ˆ φ2t
i0
,e t is a vector of exogenous disturbances, and M and m are
matrices of coeﬃcients. Investigation of the matrix M reveals that if a bounded solution exists, it
is unique.11 In this case the solution for the endogenous variables can be expressed as




where ˆ zt ≡ [ˆ πt, ˆ xt,ˆ ıt, ˆ pt]
0 , and the Lagrange multipliers follow the law of motion




for some matrices D, N, dj,n j that depend upon the parameters of the model. Woodford (2003b)
has emphasized that in the optimal plan, the endogenous variables should depend not only upon
expected future values of the disturbances, but also upon the predetermined variables ˆ φt−1.
10The steady-state values of the endogenous variables, which satisfy the previous equations at all dates in the









λi+β. The optimal steady-state inﬂation is
independent of x
∗ though not of i
∗. When i






11This dynamic system has a unique bounded solution (given a bounded process {et}) if and only if the matrix M
has exactly two eigenvalues outside the unit circle. The matrix M has two eigenvalues with modulus greater than
β
−1/2 and two with modulus smaller than β
−1/2.
94 Commitment to an Optimal Taylor Rule
We next consider an optimal policy problem in the case that the policymaker restricts its policy
by setting the interest rate according to the standard “Taylor rule”
it = ψππt + ψxxt + ψ0, (21)
at all dates t ≥ 0, where ψπ,ψx, and ψ0 are policy coeﬃcients. As mentioned in the introduction,
such a simple rule while not fully optimal is known to perform well in a wide range of models. We
focus here on the simplest Taylor rule without inertia, but we discuss an extension of this rule that
includes the lagged interest rate in section 6.2.
The policymaker is assumed to commit to the rule (21), in which the coeﬃcients ψπ,ψx, and
ψ0 are chosen so as to maximize the expected welfare (12), subject to the structural equations (4)
and (5), and assuming that the shock processes are given by (8)—(9). To determine the optimal
policy coeﬃcients, it is useful to proceed in two steps: we ﬁrst characterize the optimal equilibrium
that is consistent with the given rule, and second we determine policy coeﬃcients that correspond
to that equilibrium.
Using (21) to substitute for the interest rate in the structural equations (4) and (5), we observe
that inﬂation and the output gap must satisfy the following system of diﬀerence equations
Etzt+1 = Azt + aet, (22)
where zt ≡ [πt,x t,1]
0 , and et ≡ [re
t,u t]
0 and A and a are matrices of coeﬃcients. Given that zt does
not involve any predetermined variable, the resulting equilibrium, if it exists, must be non inertial.
The evolution of the endogenous variables can then be described by
πt = πni + πrre
t + πuut,x t = xni + xrre
t + xuut,i t = ini + irre
t + iuut, (23)
where πni,x ni,i ni are the steady-state values of the respective variables in this equilibrium, and
πr,πu, and so on, are the equilibrium response coeﬃcients to ﬂuctuations in re
t and ut.
As we show in Appendix A.1, both ir and iu are positive for any positive weights λi,λ x. Thus
the optimal non-inertial plan involves an adjustment of the nominal interest rate in the direction





(1 − βρr)(1− ρr)
, (24)
10that is, whenever the ﬂuctuations in the eﬃcient rate are not too persistent (relative to the ratio
σ
κ). Thus when (24) holds, a positive shock to the eﬃcient rate stimulates aggregate demand, so
that both the output gap and inﬂation increase. In the limiting case that the interest rate does not
enter the loss function (λi → 0), or when the persistence of the perturbations is such that (24) holds
with equality, we obtain πr = xr =0and ir =1 . As a result, in the absence of ineﬃcient supply
shocks, the central bank optimally moves the interest rate by the same amount as the eﬃcient rate
in order to stabilize the output gap and inﬂation completely.
When the disturbances to the eﬃcient rate are suﬃciently persistent (ρr large enough but still
smaller than 1) for the inequality (24) to be reversed, inﬂation and the output gap decrease in the
face of an unexpected positive shock to the eﬃcient rate in the optimal non-inertial plan. Even if
the nominal interest rate increases less than the natural rate, optimal monetary policy is restrictive
in this case, because the real interest rate (it − Etπt+1) is higher than the eﬃcient rate of interest
re
t.
For the Taylor rule to be consistent with an optimal equilibrium of the form (23), we show in









Substituting the coeﬃcients πr,x r,...with their values characterizing the optimal non-inertial equi-
librium, yields the coeﬃcients of the optimal Taylor rule as functions of the underlying structural
problem. However, for the optimal Taylor rule to implement the optimal non-inertial equilibrium,
it must guarantee that the dynamic system (22) admits a unique bounded solution. Since both
πt and xt are non-predetermined endogenous variables at date t, and {et} is bounded, this is the
c a s ei fa n do n l yi fA has exactly two eigenvalues outside the unit circle. It is well known (see, e.g.,
Woodford, 2003a, chap. 4) that if we restrict our attention to the case in which ψπ,ψx ≥ 0, then




ψx > 1. (27)
4.1 Optimal Taylor rule and sensitivity to shock processes
To get some intuition about the optimal Taylor rule, let us consider the special case in which both
perturbations have the same degree of persistence, i.e., ρr = ρu ≡ ρ. In this case, the optimal Taylor
11rule coeﬃcients reduce to
ψπ =
κ
λi (σ(1 − ρ)(1− βρ) − ρκ)
(28)
ψx =
λx (1 − βρ)
λi (σ(1 − ρ)(1− βρ) − ρκ)
. (29)
When (24) holds, both optimal Taylor-rule coeﬃcients are positive. The optimal coeﬃcient on
inﬂation, ψπ, increases with the slope to the aggregate supply, κ, to prevent a given output gap
from creating more inﬂation. Similarly the optimal coeﬃcient on output gap, ψx, increases when
λx increases, as the policymaker is more willing to stabilize the output gap. In addition, the
optimal Taylor rule becomes more responsive to both inﬂation and output gap ﬂuctuations, when
the weight λi decreases, as the policymaker is willing to let the interest rate vary more, and when
the intertemporal IS curve becomes ﬂatter (σ i ss m a l l e r ) ,a ss h o c k st ot h ee ﬃcient rate of interest
have a larger impact on the output gap and inﬂation.
These expressions reveal that the optimal Taylor coeﬃcients are particularly sensitive to the
assumed degree of persistence of the shocks. As ρ increases to approach the bound (24), which
corresponds to ρ ' 0.68 in our calibration, the optimal Taylor rule coeﬃcients become in fact
unboundedly large, and become negative when the inequality in (24) is reversed, i.e., when ρ>0.68.
Table 2 reports the optimal coeﬃcients (given by (A.55) and (A.56) in Appendix A.1) for diﬀerent
degrees of persistence of the perturbations, using the calibration summarized in Table 1. As shown
in Figure 1, these optimal Taylor coeﬃcients may change substantially with diﬀerent degrees of
shock persistence. Again, optimal policy coeﬃcients approach inﬁnity for ρ around 0.68.
While the white region of Figure 1 indicates the set of Taylor rules that result in a unique
bounded equilibrium, the gray region indicates combinations (ψπ,ψx) that result in indeterminacy
of the equilibrium. Figure 1 reveals for example that when both shocks are purely transitory
(ρr = ρu =0 ), the “optimal” Taylor rule lies in the region of indeterminacy. In fact, the “optimal”
coeﬃcients ψπ,ψx, while positive, are not large enough to satisfy (27). This means that for any
bounded solution {zt} to the diﬀerence equation (22), there exists another bounded solution of the
form
z0
t = zt + vξt
where v is an appropriately chosen (nonzero) vector, and the stochastic process {ξt} may involve
arbitrarily large ﬂuctuations, which may or may not be correlated with the fundamental distur-
bances re
t and ut. Committing to an “optimal” Taylor rule that lies in the region of indeterminacy
12can thus result in a large set of bounded equilibria, including some that involve an arbitrarily large
value of the loss criterion (12). Note from Figure 1 that the problem of indeterminacy arises not
only when ρr = ρu =0 , but also in some cases when the disturbances are more persistent (e.g.,
when ρr =0 .35 and ρu =0 , or when ρr = ρu =0 .9).
4.2 Desirability of history dependence
Even if we abstract from equilibrium indeterminacy, the optimal Taylor rule may yield substantially
higher welfare losses than the ﬁrst best. Table 2 reports the policymaker’s loss, E[L], in addition
to the following measure of variability








for the four endogenous variables, π,x,i, and p, so that E[L] is a weighted sum of V [π],V [x],
and V [i] with weights being the ones of the loss function (12).12 When ρr = ρu =0 .35, as in the
baseline calibration, the loss is 1.28 in the optimal plan, while it is 2.63 when committing to an
optimal Taylor rule. The welfare losses of generated by this simple policy rule stem primarily from
a higher variability of inﬂation and of interest rates.
To understand better the source of the welfare losses under the simple Taylor rule, we show in
Figure 2 the response of endogenous variables to an unexpected disturbance to the eﬃcient rate of
interest, using again calibration summarized in Table 1 and assuming for illustrative purposes no
shock persistence (ρr =0 ) . Under the optimal Taylor rule (dashed lines), the nominal interest rate
increases by less than the natural rate of interest, in order to dampen the variability of the nominal
interest rate. Monetary policy is therefore relatively expansionary so that inﬂation and the output
gap increase at the time of the shock. In later periods however, these variables return to their initial
steady-state as the perturbation vanishes. In contrast, in the optimal plan (solid lines), the short-
term interest rate is more inertial than the eﬃcient rate. Inertia in monetary policy is especially
desirable here because it induces the private sector to expect future restrictive monetary policy,
12The table reports the statistics in the case in which x
∗ = i
∗ =0 , so that the steady state is the same for each plan
(and is zero for each variable). The statistics measure therefore the variability of each variable around its steady state,
and the column labeled with E[L] indicates the loss due to temporary disturbances in excess of the steady-state loss.
All statistics in Table 2 are reported in annual terms. The statistics V[π], V[i], and E[L] are therefore multiplied
by 16. Furthermore, the weight λx reported in Table 1 is also multiplied by 16 in order to represent the weight
attributed to the output gap variability (in annual terms) relative to the variability of annualized inﬂation and of the
annualized interest rate.
13hence future negative output gaps which in turn have a disinﬂationary eﬀect already when the
shock hits the economy. Thus the expectation of an inertial policy response allows the policymaker
to oﬀset the inﬂationary impact of the shock by raising the short-term interest rate by less than
with the simple Taylor rule.13
Similarly, in the face of an unexpected transitory ineﬃcient supply shock ut (with ρu =0 ) ,
Figure 3 shows that the optimal Taylor rule induces the nominal interest rate to increase, so as to
reduce output (gap), and therefore to mitigate inﬂationary pressures. In the optimal plan (solid
lines), however, it is optimal to maintain the output gap below steady state even after the shock
has vanished. This generates the expectation of a slight deﬂation in later periods and thus helps
dampening the initial increase in inﬂation. The last panel conﬁrms that the price level initially rises
with the adverse shock but then declines back to almost return to its initial steady-state level. In
fact the new steady-state price level is slightly below the initial one. The optimal interest rate that
is consistent with the paths for inﬂation and the output gap hardly deviates from the steady-state,
but it remains above steady-state for several periods, so as to achieve the desired deﬂa t i o ni nl a t e r
periods.
Figures 2 and 3 reveal that with the optimal Taylor rule of the form (21), the policy response
does not introduce any inertia so that the interest rate deviates from the steady state only as long
as the shocks last. In contrast, in the optimal plan, the eﬀects of disturbances are mitigated more
eﬀectively on impact by being spread out over a longer period of time, through an inertial policy.
4.3 Welfare implications of alternative shock processes
We have shown above that the optimal Taylor rule coeﬃcients are sensitive to the degree of per-
sistence of shocks. This does not imply however that this sensitivity has important welfare im-
plications, as two simple Taylor rules with diﬀerent coeﬃcients may in principle result in similar
outcomes. To evaluate the welfare implications of alternative shock processes, we suppose that the
central bank has committed to a simple Taylor rule, optimized under a correct assumption about
the past shocks – i.e., that their law of motion is given by (8)—(9), with degrees of series correlation
13When shocks are more persistent, the nominal interest rate also increases modestly on impact, in the optimal
plan, but is expected to be higher than the eﬃcient rate in later periods, so that agents can expect a tight monetary
policy in the future, with negative output gaps and a decline of price level then. However to achieve a similar future
path of the output gap and the price level, the optimal Taylor rule needs raise the interest rate suﬃciently on impact,
so as to bring down inﬂation and the output gap already at the time of the shock. This is why the optimal Taylor
rule coeﬃcients become negative when ρr is suﬃciently large.
14ρr = ρu =0 .35 – but that it now faces new disturbances ˆ εr,m,t and ˆ εu,m,t which propagate through
the economy with a diﬀerent persistence ˆ ρ.14
Figure 4 plots welfare losses E[L] for various policy rules as a function of the degree of persistence
of the shocks re
t and ut. The dashed line represents the welfare losses implied by the commitment
to the Taylor rule optimized in our benchmark calibration, i.e., with ρr = ρu =0 .35. Note that
this policy rule which has coeﬃcients ψπ =1 .72,ψ x =0 .57 is not too diﬀerent from the policy rule
initially proposed by Taylor (1993). The ﬁgure shows again that in the benchmark case, the welfare
loss under the optimal Taylor rule (2.63) is about twice as large as in the optimal plan (1.28) denoted
here by the solid line, as documented in Table 2. However, as the shock persistence ρ increases, the
welfare performance of this simple Taylor rule deteriorates considerably with losses approaching
50, i.e., about 15 times the loss under optimal policy, as ρ approaches 1. Figure 5 shows that the
welfare deterioration is due to dramatic increases in inﬂation and interest-rate volatility under the
simple Taylor rule when the shocks become more persistent. While the Taylor rule is relatively
successful at stabilizing the output gap, this does not contribute much to the overall welfare given
the low value of λx. Figures 4 and 5 consider changes in the persistence of both shocks re
t and ut.
Similar ﬁgures emerge however when one considers changes in the persistence of one shock at a
time.
5 Commitment to a Simple Wicksellian Rule
As emphasized in the previous section, simple Taylor rules of the form (21) lack history dependence,
a key property of optimal policy in forward-looking models, and involve optimal policy coeﬃcients
that are sensitive to the degree of persistence of exogenous disturbances. We now turn to an
alternative very simple rule that introduces a desirable amount of history dependence and that
turns out to be less sensitive to shock persistence. It is given by
it = ψp (pt − ¯ pt)+ψxxt + ψ0 (30)
at all dates t ≥ 0, where ¯ pt is some deterministic trend for the (log of the) price-level satisfying
¯ pt =¯ pt−1 +¯ π, (31)
14We focus here on the properties of policy rules that have been optimized in a particular model, but we do not
evaluate policy rules that would be robust to uncertainty about the underlying model, or uncertainty about driving
shock processes. For the characterization of policy rules that are robust to model uncertainty, see e.g., Giannoni
(2002, 2007), Hansen and Sargent (2008).
15and ¯ π is a constant. Following Woodford (2003a, chap. 2) we call such a rule a Wicksellian rule. The
price level depends by deﬁnition not only on current inﬂation but also on all past rates of inﬂation.
It follows that the rule (30) introduces history dependence in monetary policy, as it forces the
policymaker to compensate any shock that might have aﬀected inﬂation in the past. While rules of
this form are as simple as standard Taylor rules, they have received less attention in recent studies
of monetary policy. One reason may be because it is widely believed that such rules would result
in a larger variability of inﬂation (and the output gap), as the policymaker would respond to an
inﬂa t i o n a r ys h o c kb yg e n e r a t i n gi n ﬂation below target in subsequent periods. However, as we show
below, this is not true when agents are forward-looking and they understand that the policymaker
commits to a rule of the form (30). Although the policymaker and the private sector do not care
about the price level per se, as the latter does not enter the loss criterion (12), we shall argue that
a Wicksellian rule has desirable properties for the conduct of monetary policy.
To characterize the equilibrium that obtains if the policymaker commits to (30), we consider
a steady state in which in which inﬂation, the output gap and the nominal interest rate take
respectively the constant values πwr,x wr,i wr, we deﬁne the deviations from the steady state as
ˆ πt ≡ πt −πwr, ˆ xt ≡ xt −xwr, ˆ ıt ≡ it −iwr, and we let ˆ pt ≡ pt − ¯ pt be the (percentage) deviation of
the price level from its trend. As discussed in Appendix A.2, using (30) to substitute for ˆ ıt in the
intertemporal IS equation, we can rewrite (4), (5), and (2) in matrix form as
Etzt+1 = ˆ Azt +ˆ aet, (32)
where zt ≡ [ˆ πt, ˆ xt, ˆ pt−1]
0 ,e t ≡ [re
t,u t]
0 , and ˆ A and ˆ a are matrices of coeﬃcients. Assuming again
that the law of motion of the disturbances is given by (8) and (9), the resulting equilibrium is then
of the form
ˆ zt = zrre
t + zuut + zpˆ pt−1 (33)
for any variable ˆ zt ∈ {ˆ πt, ˆ xt,ˆ ıt, ˆ pt}, where zr,z u,z p are equilibrium response coeﬃcients to ﬂuctu-
ations in re
t, ut,a n dpt−1. As further shown in Appendix A.2, the policy coeﬃcients ψp and ψx









The optimal equilibrium resulting from a Wicksellian rule (30) is therefore characterized by the
optimal steady state and the optimal response coeﬃcients zr,z u,z p in (33) that minimize the loss
16function (12) subject to the constraints (2), (4), (5), and (30), where ψp and ψx are given by (34)
and (35). For the Wicksellian rule to implement the desired equilibrium, though, it must guarantee
that the dynamic system (32) admits a unique bounded solution. This is the case if and only if ˆ A
admits exactly two unstable eigenvalues. An analysis of the matrix ˆ A yields the following result.
Proposition 1 In the model composed of (4), (5), (2), with σ, κ > 0 and 0 <β<1, ac o m m i t m e n t
to the Wicksellian policy rule (30) results in a unique bounded rational expectations equilibrium
{πt,x t,i t,p t}, if
ψp > 0 and ψx ≥ 0. (36)
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Hence any Wicksellian rule with positive coeﬃcients implies a determinate equilibrium.15 In
general, the coeﬃcients of optimal Wicksellian rule are complicated functions of the parameters
of the model. Moreover, unlike those of the optimal Taylor rule, they are also function of the
variance of the shocks. Rather than trying to characterize analytically the optimal Wicksellian
rule, we proceed with a numerical investigation of its properties and its implications for equilibrium
inﬂation, output gap and the nominal interest rate.
5.1 A comparison of Taylor rules and Wicksellian rules
Figure 6 reports optimal coeﬃcients of the Wicksellian rule for diﬀerent degrees of shock persistence
(ρr;ρu). It is noteworthy that all optimal policy coeﬃcients are positive for this wide range of shock
persistence. It follows from Proposition 1 that these policy rules result in a determinate equilibrium.
This contrasts with the optimal Taylor rules presented in Figure 1, which for some combinations
yield an indeterminate equilibrium. Furthermore, while the optimal Taylor rule coeﬃcients vary
importantly with diﬀerent degrees of shock persistence, Figure 6 shows that the optimal coeﬃcients
of Wicksellian rules are concentrated in a narrower area that those of optimal Taylor rules (Figure
1). The optimal Wicksellian rules are thus less sensitive to the diﬀerent assumptions about serial
correlation of the disturbances.
In addition, optimal Wicksellian rules also introduce a kind of history dependence that is de-
sirable for monetary policy. In fact, as shown in Figures 2 and 3, transitory increases in re
t and
ut do generate persistent deviations of the endogenous variables when policy is set according to
the optimal Wicksellian rule (dashed-dotted lines). Commitment to an optimal Wicksellian policy
15A similar result is mentioned in Kerr and King (1996), in the case that ψx is set to 0.
17allows the policymaker to achieve a response of endogenous variables that is closer to the optimal
plan than is the case with the optimal Taylor rule.
One particularity of the equilibrium resulting from a Wicksellian policy, of course, is that
the price level is stationary, unlike the Taylor rule which does not oﬀset shifts in the price level
following exogenous disturbances. In the optimal plan, policy also eventually brings the price level
to its original trend in the face of ineﬃcient supply shocks ut. However, when the economy is hit
by exogenous ﬂuctuations in re
t and there is a concern for interest-rate stabilization (λi > 0), it is
not optimal for the price level to be stable. In fact, in the optimal plan, Figure 2 shows that the
price level is expected to end up at a slightly lower level in the future. While not fully optimal,
the Wicksellian policy reduces welfare losses considerably by introducing history dependence and
oﬀsetting ﬂuctuations in the price level. Another notable feature of optimal Wicksellian policy in
Figure 3 is that the interest rate rises importantly, so that the response of inﬂation remains close
to the optimal response. While this of creates a signiﬁcant drop in output (gap) in our calibration,
the welfare loss is only moderately aﬀected by the recession, given the low weight λx.
In fact a comparison of the welfare implications for both Taylor and Wicksellian rules suggests
that Wicksellian rules result in general in a lower welfare loss, in the model considered here. We
ﬁrst show this analytically in a simple case and then proceed with a numerical investigation of the
more general case.
A special case. To simplify the analysis, we consider the special case in which the short-term
aggregate supply equation is perfectly ﬂat so that κ =0 ,a n db o t hs h o c k sh a v et h es a m ed e g r e eo f
serial correlation ρ. In this case, we can solve for equilibrium inﬂa t i o nu s i n g( 5 ) ,a n dw eo b t a i n
πt = βEtπt+1 + ut =
∞ X
j=0
βjEtut+j =( 1− βρ)
−1 ut.
Inﬂation is perfectly exogenous in this case. The best the policymaker can do is therefore to
minimize the variability of the output gap and the interest rate.





and so involves no response to inﬂation. Since inﬂa t i o ni sc a n n o tb ea ﬀected by monetary policy
in this case, it would be desirable to respond to inﬂation only if this would help dampening ﬂuctu-
ations in the output gap and the interest rate. However, since the Taylor rule is non inertial, the
18equilibrium endogenous variables depend only on contemporaneous shocks (see (23)). It follows
that one cannot reduce the variability of future output gaps and interest rates by responding to
current shocks in inﬂation. Responding to contemporaneous ﬂuctuations in inﬂation would only
make the interest rate and the output gap more volatile.
In contrast, with a Wicksellian rule, the policymaker’s response to contemporaneous price-level
ﬂuctuations and the belief that he will respond in the same way to price-level ﬂuctuations in the
future have a desirable eﬀect on the expected future path of the output gap and the interest rate.
We can establish the following result.
Proposition 2 When κ =0and ρr = ρu ≡ ρ>0, there exists a Wicksellian rule of the form (30)
that results in a unique bounded equilibrium, and that achieves a lower loss than the one resulting
from the optimal Taylor rule.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
General case: A numerical investigation. In the more general case in which κ>0 and
we allow for arbitrary degrees of serial correlation of the shocks, the analytical characterization is
substantially more complicated. However a numerical investigation suggests again that appropriate
Wicksellian rules perform better than the optimal Taylor rule in terms of the loss criterion (12).
Using the calibration of Table 1, and for various degrees persistence of the disturbances, Table
2 reveals that the loss is systematically lower with the optimal Wicksellian rule than it is with
the optimal Taylor rule. For instance, when ρr = ρu = .35, the loss is 1.67 with the Wicksellian
rule, compared to 2.63 with the Taylor rule, and 1.28 with the fully optimal rule.16 This relatively
good performance of the Wicksellian rules is due to the low variability of inﬂation and the nominal
interest rate. On the other hand, the output gap is in general more volatile under the optimal
Wicksellian rule. Of course the variability of the price level is much higher for fully optimal rules
and optimal Taylor rules, but this does not aﬀect the loss criterion. While the results of Table
2 are based on our benchmark calibration, we still ﬁnd, for alternative assumptions about the
parameters λx,ρ r,ρ u, and the variances of the shocks, that the welfare loss E[L] i m p l i e db yt h e
optimal Wicksellian rule is lower than that implied by the optimal Taylor rule, and is only slightly
higher than in the optimal plan.
16Recall that Table 2 indicates the losses due to ﬂuctuations around the steady state. However, since the steady
states are the same for the optimal Taylor rule and the optimal Wicksellian rule, the comparison of statistics is also
relevant for levels of the variables, for any values x
∗,i
∗.
19In addition, the simple Wicksellian rules tur no u tt ob ev e r yr o b u s tt oa l t e r n a t i v es p e c i ﬁcations
of the shock processes. Looking again at Figures 4 and 5, we observe that an optimal Wicksellian
rule – optimized under the assumption that the serial correlation of the shocks is ρr = ρu =
0.35 – performs again very well when the economy is hit by new disturbances ˆ εr,m,t and ˆ εu,m,t
which propagate through the economy with a diﬀerent persistence ˆ ρ. The welfare losses under
the Wicksellian rule (dashed-dotted line) remain only slightly above the losses in the ﬁrst best,
even for very high degrees of shock persistence. This is very diﬀerent from the performance of
simple Taylor rules which imply very high losses when ρ approaches 1, and suggests that the
commitment to bringing the price level back to its original trend is an eﬀective way of guarding
against misspeciﬁcations or changes of the shock processes.
6 Introducing Interest-Rate Inertia
Wicksellian rules have the desirable feature of introducing history dependence while the simple
Taylor rules considered so far are by assumption not inertial. One natural question is thus whether
the performance of simple Taylor rules could not be dramatically improved by letting the interest
rate respond also to past interest rates, as this would introduce at least some form of history
dependence in policy. To answer this question, we ﬁrst characterize a fully optimal rule.
6.1 A Robustly Optimal Policy Rule
As argued in Giannoni (2001, Chap. 1) and Giannoni and Woodford (2003a,b, 2010), it is possible
under general conditions to ﬁnd a policy rule that is optimal – i.e., that minimizes the welfare loss
E[L] subject to the constraints (4) and (5) imposed by the private sector – and that is also robust
to alternative speciﬁcations of the shock processes. This robustly optimal policy rule is obtained by
combining the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions (14)—(17) characterizing the optimal state-contingent
plan. These ﬁrst-order conditions involve only two types of variables: variables entering the poli-
cymakers’ objective function (i.e., target variables) and Lagrange multipliers. Combining them to
eliminate the Lagrange multipliers yields a single equation involving only target variables, which
can be interpreted as an implicit policy rule. We thus solve (16) for φ1t as a function of it, and (15)
for φ2t as a function of xt,i t,i t−1, and use the resulting expressions to substitute for the Lagrange
20multipliers in (14). This yields the instrument rule17
it = ψππt + ψx∆xt +( 1+ψi)it−1 + ψ∆i∆it−1 − ψii∗ (37)




> 0,ψ x =
λx
λiσ
> 0,ψ i =
κ
βσ
> 0,ψ ∆i = β−1 > 1. (38)
This rule necessarily holds in the optimal plan in all period t ≥ 2, f o ri ti sc o n s i s t e n tw i t h
the ﬁrst-order conditions (14)—(16) at these dates. For this policy rule to implement the optimal
equilibrium, it must not merely be consistent with with the optimal plan, it must also determine
a unique bounded equilibrium. Remarkably, the rule (37) also has this very desirable property.
In fact, a commitment to the policy rule (37) at all dates t ≥ 0 implies a determinate rational-
expectations equilibrium (see Giannoni and Woodford, 2003b, Proposition 1).18
The equilibrium implied by a commitment to the time-invariant policy rule (37) at all dates
t ≥ 0 is the unique bounded solution the structural equations (4)—(5), the ﬁrst-order conditions
(14)—(16) at all dates t ≥ 0, where the initial Lagrange multipliers φ1,−1,φ 2,−1 are not given by (17)
but depend instead on the historical values x−1,i −1, and i−2, through the equations (14)—(16). Such
a policy involves the same response to random shocks in periods t ≥ 0 as in the optimal (Ramsey)
plan, and is a rule that is optimal from a timeless perspective (see, e.g., Woodford 1999).19
A further very interesting feature of this policy rule is that it does not involve any shock.20
The optimal policy rule (37) has thus the very desirable property of being completely robust to the
speciﬁcation of the shock processes, even if the latter are of the form speciﬁed in (6)—(7), as long
as they are bounded.
An implication of this is that a commitment to the optimal rule (37) with coeﬃcients given by
(38) does not only implement the optimal plan in the case of the assumed autocorrelation of the
17This rule is analogous to what Svensson (2003) calls an optimal speciﬁc targeting rule.
18As further shown in Giannoni and Woodford (2010), a policy rule (or target criterion) constructed in this fashion
from the ﬁrst-order conditions associated with the optimal policy problem implies a locally determinate equilibrium
under very general conditions, even in the context of large-scale nonlinear models.
19The optimal (Ramsey) plan is the bounded solution to the structural equations (4)—(5), the ﬁrst-order conditions
(14)—(16) at all dates t ≥ 0, where the initial Lagrange multipliers φ1,−1,φ 2,−1are given by (17). Such a plan can be
implemented by the time-varying rule given by i0 = ψππ0+ψxx0, in period 0,i 1 = ψππ1+ψx (x1 − x0)+(1+ψi1)i0
in period 1 and (37) at all dates t ≥ 2.
20More generally, as long as the shocks enter in an additively separable fashion in the policymaker’s objective
function and in the constraints imposed by the private sector, the ﬁrst-order conditions to the optimal policy problem
don’t involve any exogenous shocks or even any properties of their driving processes.
21shocks, but also for any other degree of shock persistence. As a result, the policymaker would not
need to reconsider its commitment and change the rule in the event that the economy would be
hit by shocks that have diﬀerent properties than then ones observed prior to the commitment. By
keeping the policy rule unchanged, it would continue to achieve the optimal equilibrium, hence the
lowest possible loss for any value of ρ. The welfare losses associated with the rule (37)—(38) are
therefore the ones associated with the optimal plan, and displayed by the solid line in Figures 4
and 5, for diﬀerent values of ρ.21
Equation (37) indicates that to implement the optimal plan, the central bank should relate the
interest rate positively to ﬂuctuations in current inﬂation, in changes of the output gap, and in
lagged interest rates.22 Note ﬁnally that the interest rate should not only be inertial in the sense of
being positively related to past values of the interest rate, it should be super-inertial, as the lagged








L+β−1L2 =( 1− z1L)(1 − z2L)
involves a root z1 > 1 while the other root z2 ∈ (0,1). A reaction greater than one of the interest rate
to its lagged value has initially been found by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) to be a desirable
feature of a good policy rule in their econometric model with optimizing agents. As explained
further in Woodford (2003b), it is precisely such a super-inertial rule that the policymaker should
follow to bring about the optimal responses to shocks when economic agents are forward-looking.
Optimal policy requires rapidly raising the interest rate to deviations of inﬂation and the output
gap from the target (which is 0), if such deviations are not subsequently undone. But of course,
21While assume here that the policymaker knows with certainty the model of the economy, though it may face
uncertainty about the shock processes, Walsh (2004) has shown that the same rule turns out to be robust to mis-
speciﬁcations of the structural model of the kind considered by Hansen and Sargent (2008). According to Hansen
and Sargent’s robust control approach, the policymaker views its model as an approximation to the true model, with
the true model being in a neighborhood of the approximating model. Such a problem can be represented by a game
between the policymaker who seeks to minimize the loss function (12) while a malevolent agent tries to maximize
it. The central bank thus attempts to characterize a robust rule that performs as well as possible in this worst-case
scenario. As Walsh (2004) has shown, such a robust rule in our model would take exactly the same form as (37)— (38).
However, as Walsh (2004) emphasizes, while the rule is the same in the two approaches, diﬀerent macroeconomic
behavior would be observed, as expectations are formed diﬀerently in the two approaches.
22From a practical point of view, it might be an advantage to respond to changes in the output gap rather than the
level as the change in the output gap may be known with greater precision. For example, Orphanides (2003) shows
that subsequent revisions of U.S. output gap estimates have been quite large (sometimes as large as 5.6 percentage
points), while revisions of estimates of the quarterly change in the output gap have been much smaller.
22such a policy is perfectly consistent with a stationary rational expectations equilibrium, and in
fact is the one generating the lowest overall welfare loss and a low variability of the interest rate
in equilibrium. In fact, the interest rate does not explode in equilibrium because the current and
expected future optimal levels of the interest rate counteract the eﬀects of an initial deviation in
inﬂation and the output gap by generating subsequent deviations with the opposite sign of these
variables, as shown in Figures 2 and 3.23
The coeﬃcients of the optimal policy rule are reported in the upper right panel of Table 2,
for our benchmark calibration.24 For comparison, the last panel of Table 2 reports the coeﬃcients
derived from Judd and Rudebusch’s (1998) estimation of actual Fed reaction functions between
1987:3 and 1997:4, along with the statistics that such a policy would imply if the model provided a
correct description of the actual economy.25 As shown on Table 2, the estimated historical rule in
the baseline case involves only slightly smaller responses to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and the output
gap than the optimal rule. However the estimated response to lagged values of the interest rate is
sensibly smaller that the optimal one.
6.2 Simple Rules and Interest Rate Inertia
The analysis of the optimal policy rule (37) suggests that it is desirable for the current interest rate
to respond strongly to movements in the past interest rate. While the policy rule (37) achieves
the lowest possible loss in the model considered and remains relatively simple, recent research has
given considerable attention to even simpler policy rules (see, e.g., contributions collected in Taylor,
1999). As we now show, even if we allow for considerable inertia in interest rate in the policy rule,
it remains preferable to respond to ﬂuctuations in the price level than in the inﬂation rate. To
see this, consider a minor departure from the optimal rule (37) with coeﬃcients given by (38),
neglecting the term ψi (it−1 −¯ ı) and setting ψ∆i to 1 instead of β−1.26 After this simpliﬁcation,
23Optimal interest-rate rules are super-inertial under general conditions, as long as the private sector is suﬃciently
forward-looking (see, Giannoni and Woodford, 2003a). Some authors have however criticized such rules, on the
grounds that they perform poorly in non-rational expectations, backward-looking, models (e.g., Taylor, 1999b). This
should not be surprising since super-inertial rules rely precisely on the private sector’s forward-looking behavior.
24The coeﬃcients ψx reported here are multiplied by 4, so that the response coeﬃcients to output gap, and to
annualized inﬂation are expressed in the same units. (See footnote 12.)
25The estimated historical policy rule refers to regression A for the Greenspan period in Judd and Rudebusch
(1998).
26D o i n gs op r e v e n t st h er u l ef r o mb e i n gs u p e r - i n e r t i a l ,af eature that has been criticized on the grounds that such
rules lead to explosive behavior in models which involve no rational expectations and no forward-looking behavior
23and using (2), the rule (37) reduces to
∆it = ψπ (∆pt − ¯ π)+ψx∆xt + ∆it−1 (39)
where ψπ and ψx are again given by (38), and the steady-state inﬂation rate is given by ¯ π = λii∗/β.
A s s u m i n gf u r t h e r m o r et h a ta ts o m ep o i n tt0 − 1 in the past, the interest rate satisﬁed it0−1 =
ψπ (pt0−1 − ¯ pt0−1)+ψxxt0−1 +it0−2 and using (31) implies that a commitment to (39) at all dates
t ≥ t0 is equivalent a commitment to the rule
it = ψπ (pt − ¯ pt)+ψxxt + it−1 (40)
at all dates t ≥ t0. This of course is none else than a Wicksellian rule augmented with the
lagged interest rate. Given that the coeﬃcient on the lagged interest rate is 1, this quasi-optimal
rule speciﬁes how changes in the interest rate ∆it should be set as a function of ﬂuctuations in
the price level (in log deviations from a trend) and the output gap. The rule (40) reveals that
a desirable policy involves even more history dependence than we had considered in the case of
simple Wicksellian rules.
Table 3 quantiﬁes the welfare losses implied by a commitment to the quasi-optimal rule (40) for
diﬀerent degrees of shock persistence. Figures 4 and 5 also plot the welfare losses (with black dots)
as a function the shocks’ autocorrelation. Importantly, this very simple rule performs remarkably
well, with welfare losses appear only marginally higher than in the fully optimal rule for a very wide
range of shock persistence, given that the policy coeﬃcients are totally invariant to the assumed
properties of the shock process.
To contrast, we consider now an expanded version of the Taylor rule that allows for interest
rate inertia
it = ψπ (πt − ¯ π)+ψxxt + it−1, (41)
where ψπ and ψx are again given by (38). Clearly, introducing a large amount of interest rate inertia
contributes to reducing the welfare losses substantially: comparing Tables 2 and 3, we note that
the welfare losses drop from 2.63 to 1.38 when introducing the lagged interest rate in the Taylor
rule and ρr = ρu =0 .35. This is not surprising, in light of the discussion in sections 2 and 3, as the
rule (41) resembles closely the simple Wicksellian rule, were it not for the response to the output
gap.27 In addition, Levin et al. (1999) show that rules that have a coeﬃcient of one on the lagged
(see, e.g., Taylor 1999b).
27Indeed, assuming that at some point t0 − 1 in the past the interest rate satisﬁed it0−1 = ψπ (pt0−1 − ¯ pt0−1)+
24interest rate tend to perform well across models, and Orphanides and Williams (2007) show that
such rules are robust to potential misspeciﬁcation of private sector learning, in a model in which
agents have imperfect knowledge about the the structure of the economy. However, as Figure 4
and 5 show, the performance of the rule (41) deteriorates also markedly as the shock persistence
increases. So, while allowing for high degree of interest inertia in interest rates allows to improve
the performance of simple policy rules, our results show that it remains preferable for the interest
rate to respond to price-level ﬂuctuations than to inﬂation ﬂuctuations in the model considered,
and the gains from price-level stabilization are larger in the face of misspeciﬁcations of the shock
processes.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has characterized the properties of various simple interest-rate rules in the context of
a stylized structural forward-looking model of the economy. We have compared the performance
of simple Taylor rules and simple Wicksellian rules – which determine the interest rate as a
function of deviations of the price level from its trend and an output gap – to determine whether
the central bank’s objective function, which is assumed to depend on the volatility of inﬂation,
output gap and interest rate, is best achieved by a policy that responds to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation
or the price level. We have shown that appropriate Wicksellian rules result systematically in a
lower welfare loss, a lower variability of inﬂation and of the nominal interest rate than optimal
Taylor rules, by introducing desirable history dependence in monetary policy. The coeﬃcients of
optimal Wicksellian rules have the further advantage of being less sensitive to alternative degrees of
persistence in the shock processes. An implication of this is that Wicksellian rules perform better
than simple Taylor rules in the face of changes in shock processes. This makes a commitment to
simple Wicksellian rules more appealing as their robustness property provides little ground for a
reconsideration of the commitment when the economy is aﬀected by new kinds of disturbances.
Moreover, Wicksellian rules are less prone to equilibrium indeterminacy than optimal Taylor rules.
The fact that simple Wicksellian rules perform so well in our model becomes clear when we
observe a simple Wicksellian rule augmented with a large amount of interest-rate inertia (40)
resembles a robustly optimal rule which, as argued in Giannoni and Woodford (2003a,b, 2010),
ψxxt0−1, ac o m m i t m e n tt ot h e“ d i ﬀerence rule” ∆it = ψπ (πt − ¯ π)+ψx∆xt at all dates t ≥ t0 is equivalent a
commitment to the Wicksellian rule it = ψπ (pt − ¯ pt)+ψxxt at all dates t ≥ t0.
25implements the optimal plan and is also completely robust to the speciﬁcation of exogenous shock
processes. A Wicksellian rule of this form states that changes (and not the level) of the policy
rates should depend positively on the deviations of the price level from trend, and the output gap.
This rule remains very simple, is again fully robust to the speciﬁcation of the shock processes,
and introduces an even great amount of history dependence than simple Wicksellian rules, which
yields a remarkable welfare performance in the model considered. Such a rule should thus be
particularly appealing to policymakers who search for a simple rule, yet worry about unforeseeable
circumstances (shocks) aﬀecting the economy in the future.
O u rr e s u l t sh a v eb e e nd e r i v e dh e r ei na na r g u a b l yv e r ys t y l i z e dm o d e l ,i nw h i c ha g e n t sh a v ef u l l
information about the current state of the economy, and are completely rational. This has allowed
us to emphasize that the history dependence generated by the price-level stabilization results in
important welfare gains and has good robustness properties to the assumed shock processes. Recent
research suggests that the beneﬁts from price-level stabilization hold in more general setups. In
fact, Preston (2008) assumes in a similar model that private agents are non-rational and learn
adaptively. He shows that a price-level target corrects past mistakes and yields better welfare results
than inﬂation stabilization when the central bank cannot perfectly understand private agents’
behavior. This is consistent with Orphanides and Williams (2007)’s conclusion on the desirability
of “diﬀerence” interest-rate rules, which resemble our Wicksellian rules. Gaspar, Smets and Vestin
(2007), using in a medium-scale model involving a number of rigidities and inertial behavior of the
private sector ﬁnd that the stabilization of the price-level path is a simple and eﬀective way of
implementing a desirable equilibrium. A concern raised by Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) is
that a commitment to price-level stabilization may propagate iid measurement errors in inﬂation.
However Gorodnichenko and Shapiro (2007) considering a forward-looking model with backward-
looking features show that a rule akin to our Wicksellian rule can eﬀectively stabilize the economy
in the face of imperfectly observed shifts in potential output growth or surprises in the price
level. Boivin (2009) and Woodford (2010) similarly argue that stabilizing the price level might be
more desirable in the event that the price level is not perfectly observed, provided that the public
is suﬃciently forward looking and understands the policy regime. In addition, Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003), Wolman (2005) and Billi (2008) have argued that a commitment to price-level
stabilization (possibly around a drifting path), may be an eﬀective way of preventing deﬂations,
and exiting from deﬂationary traps. While these papers emphasize diﬀerent desirable features of
price-level stabilization, they all point to some robustness property of price-level stabilization.
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AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Optimal non-inertial plan and optimal Taylor rule
In a non-inertial equilibrium, the coeﬃcients πni,πr,πu, and so on characterizing the solution (23)
need to satisfy the structural equations (4) and (5) at each date, and for every possible realization of
the shocks. These coeﬃcients need therefore to satisfy the following feasibility restrictions, obtained
by substituting (23) into the structural equations (4) and (5):
(1 − β)πni − κxni =0 (A.42)
πni − ini =0 (A.43)
(1 − ρr)xr + σ−1 (ir − ρrπr − 1) = 0 (A.44)
(1 − βρr)πr − κxr =0 (A.45)
(1 − ρu)xu + σ−1 (iu − ρuπu)=0 (A.46)
(1 − βρu)πu − κxu − 1=0 . (A.47)
Similarly, substituting (23) into (12), and using E(re



























To determine the optimal non-inertial plan, we choose the equilibrium coeﬃcients that minimize the
loss E[L0] subject to the restrictions (A.42) — (A.47). The steady-state of the optimal non-inertial
equilibrium is then given by
ini = πni =
(1 − β)κ−1λxx∗ + λii∗
1+( 1− β)




(1 − β)κ−1λxx∗ + λii∗
1+( 1− β)
2 κ−2λx + λi
, (A.48)
and the optimal response coeﬃcients to ﬂuctuations in re
t and ut in the optimal non-inertial equi-
librium are given by
πr =
λi (σγr − ρrκ)κ
hr
,π u =




λi (σγr − ρrκ)(1− βρr)
hr
,x u = −




λx (1 − βρr)
2 + κ2
hr
> 0,i u =

















¢2 + κ2 > 0,
30and where j ∈ {r,u}.
For the Taylor rule to be consistent with an equilibrium of the form (23), the policy coeﬃcients
must satisfy the following restrictions
ir = ψππr + ψxxr (A.52)
iu = ψππu + ψxxu (A.53)
ini = ψππni + ψxxni + ψ0 (A.54)
obtained by substituting the solutions (23) into (21). Solving (A.52)—(A.53) for the policy coeﬃ-
cients and substituting the coeﬃcients πr,x r,...,with the expressions in (A.49)—(A.51) character-
izing the optimal non-inertial equilibrium, yields the optimal Taylor coeﬃcients
ψπ =
(κ − ρuλi (σγu − ρuκ))
¡
ξr (1 − βρr)+κ2¢
+( σκ(1 − ρu)+ρuξu)λi (σγr − ρrκ)(1− βρr)
λi (σγr − ρrκ)((κ − ρuλi (σγu − ρuκ))κ +( λiσ(σγu − ρuκ)(1− ρu)+ξu)(1− βρr))
(A.55)
ψx =
(λiσ(σγu − ρuκ)(1− ρu)+ξu)
¡
ξr (1 − βρr)+κ2¢
− λi (σγr − ρrκ)κ(σκ(1 − ρu)+ρuξu)












> 0, and j ∈ {r,u}. Note that these
expressions are well deﬁned provided that σγr − ρrκ 6=0 .
The constant ψ0 is then obtained by solving (A.54), using the preceding expressions for ψπ and
ψx.
A.2 Optimal Wicksellian rule
We observe from (4) and (5) that in a steady state




The structural equations (4), (5) can then be expressed in terms of the hatted variables representing
deviations from the steady state, and the policy rule (30) may be written as28
ˆ ıt = ψpˆ pt + ψxˆ xt. (A.58)









































28To obtain (A.58), we make an implicit assumption on the coeﬃcient ψ0 which has no eﬀect on the welfare analysis
that follows. First, note from (30) that ˆ pt must be constant in the steady state. For convenience, we set this constant
to zero. The optimal policy coeﬃcient ψ0 is the only coeﬃcient aﬀected by this normalization, but this has no eﬀect
on optimal monetary policy. Comparing (30) and (A.58) one can see that ψ0 is implicitly given by ψ0 = i
wr−ψxx
wr.
Note also from the deﬁnition of inﬂation that πt = pt − pt−1 =ˆ pt − ˆ pt−1 +¯ π. Hence, in the steady state, we have
π
wr =¯ π.
31Assuming again that the law of motion of the disturbances is given by (8) and (9), the resulting
equilibrium is of the form (33).
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The optimal steady state is then found by minimizing the ﬁrst term in brackets in (A.61) subject
to (A.57). Since this is the same problem as the one encountered for the optimal non-inertial plan,
we have
πwr = πni,x wr = xni, and iwr = ini. (A.63)
where πni,x ni, and ini are given in (A.48).
To determine the optimal equilibrium responses to disturbances, we note, as in the optimal non-
inertial plan, that the solution (33) may only describe an equilibrium if the coeﬃcients zr,z u,z p
satisfy the structural equations (4) and (5) at each date, and for every possible realization of the
shocks. These coeﬃcients need therefore to satisfy the following feasibility restrictions, obtained
by substituting (33) into the structural equations (4), (5), and using (2):
xr (1 − ρr) − xppr + σ−1 (ir +( 1− pp − ρr)pr − 1) = 0 (A.64)
xu (1 − ρu) − xppu + σ−1 (iu +( 1− pp − ρu)pu)=0 (A.65)
xp − xppp + σ−1 (ip +( 1− pp)pp)=0 (A.66)
(βρr + βpp − 1 − β)pr + κxr =0 (A.67)
(βρu + βpp − 1 − β)pu + κxu +1 = 0 (A.68)
(βpp − 1 − β)pp + κxp +1 = 0 . (A.69)
Similarly, substituting the solution (33) into the policy rule (A.58) yields
ir = ψppr + ψxxr (A.70)
iu = ψppu + ψxxu (A.71)
ip = ψppp + ψxxp. (A.72)
















xp =0 , (A.75)
which is an additional constraint that must be satisﬁed by the equilibrium coeﬃcients, for the
structural equations and the policy rule to be satisﬁed at each date and in every state.
32Finally using (2), the solution (33), and the laws of motion (8) and (9), we can rewrite the loss
(A.62) as

















































The optimal equilibrium resulting from a Wicksellian rule (30) is therefore characterized by the
optimal steady state (A.63), and the optimal response coeﬃcients pr,p u, and so on, that minimize
the loss function (A.76) subject to the constraints (A.64) — (A.69) and (A.75). The coeﬃcients of
the optimal Wicksellian rule that are consistent with that equilibrium are in turn determined by
(A.73) and (A.74).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The model composed of (4), (5), (2), with a commitment to the Wicksellian policy rule (30) can
be expressed in matrix form as the dynamic system (A.59) with transition matrix (A.60). The
characteristic polynomial associated to ˆ A is






κ + σβ +2 σ + ψxβ + κψp + ψx
βσ
A2 = −
2σβ + σ + κ + ψxβ
βσ
.
The system (A.59) results in a determinate equilibrium if and only if the characteristic polynomial
P (X) admits two roots outside and one root inside the unit circle. Using Proposition C.2 of
Woodford (2003a), P (X) has one root inside the unit circle and two roots outside if
P (1) > 0,P (−1) < 0, and |A2| > 3.





P (−1) = −
2κ +4 σ(1 + β)+κψp +2( 1+β)ψx
βσ
< 0




Hence P (X) has exactly 2 roots outside the unit circle, and (A.59) results in a determinate equi-
librium.
33A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
In this proof, we show that the loss criterion (12) for the optimal Taylor rule is higher than the
one for a particular Wicksellian rule. Since the optimal steady-state is the same for both families
of rules, it is suﬃcient to compare the loss E[ˆ L] resulting from deviations from the steady-state.
Loss for optimal Taylor rule. When κ =0 , and ρr = ρu = ρ the equilibrium resulting from
the optimal Taylor rule, i.e., the optimal non-inertial equilibrium characterized in (A.49) — (A.51),
reduces to
πr =0 ,π u =( 1− βρ)
−1
xr =




λiσ(1 − ρ)(1− βρ)ρ
h
ir =




λx (1 − βρ)ρ
h
where h ≡ λiσ2 (1 − ρ)
2 (1 − βρ)
2 + λx (1 − βρ)
2 > 0. It follows from (2) that pr =0 ,p u =
(1 − βρ)
−1 and pp =1 , in this equilibrium. Using these expressions to substitute for the equilibrium
coeﬃcient in the loss function (A.76), we obtain29
E[ˆ Ltr]=
λiλx







+ λiσ2 (1 − ρ)
2
³




2 var (ut). (A.77)
Loss for some particular Wicksellian rule. I nt h ec a s ei nw h i c hκ =0and ρr = ρu =
ρ>0, the restrictions (A.64) — (A.69) and (A.75) constraining the equilibrium resulting from any
Wicksellian rule (A.58) can be solved in terms of xr,x u to yield:
pr =0 ,p u =
1
1 − βρ
,p p =1 (A.78)
xp =
xu (1 − βρ) − xrρ
1+xrσρ
(A.79)
ir =1 − xrσ(1 − ρ),i u = ρ
(1 − xrσ(1 − ρ))(1 + xuσ(1 − βρ))
(1 + xrσρ)(1− βρ)
,i p =0 . (A.80)
There is also a second solution which is not admissible as it involves pp = β−1 > 1, hence an
explosive price level (in terms of deviations from a trend). Consider now an equilibrium in which
xr and xu satisfy
xr =
λiσ(1 − ρ)






















(1 − βρ)+λx (1 + βρ)
¢
,
29Note that the equilibrium characterized here is a special case of the equilibrium (33) used to derive the loss
function (A.76).

















(1 − ρ)+λx (1 + βρ)
(1 − βρ)∆
ip =0
Expressions (A.81) and (A.82 do in general not correspond to the values of xr and xu that would
minimize the loss criterion (A.76). (In fact they would minimize (A.76) in the special case that
var (ut)=0 .) As a result this equilibrium is not the optimal equilibrium that might be obtained
with a Wicksellian rule. We focus here on a suboptimal equilibrium because it is easier to charac-
terize analytically. We will call this equilibrium a “quasi-optimal equilibrium”. One implication of
course is that the resulting loss, E[ˆ Lqwr], cannot be smaller than the one obtained in the optimal
equilibrium, E[ˆ Lwr], so that
E[ˆ Lqwr] ≥ E[ˆ Lwr].
The Wicksellian rule of the form (A.58) that implements this quasi-optimal equilibrium is
obtained by using (A.73) and (A.74). Substituting for the above equilibrium coeﬃcients in (A.73)
and (A.74) yields:
ψp =
ρλx (1 − β)
¡
1 − βρ2¢





Since ψp > 0 and ψx > 0, it follows from proposition 1 (in Appendix A.3) that this rule results in
a unique bounded equilibrium.





















β (1 + βρ)
(1 − βρ)


























Comparing the losses. Comparing (A.77) and (A.83), we obtain after some algebraic manipu-
lations: E[ˆ Ltr] > E[ˆ Lqwr]. Thus
E[ˆ Ltr] > E[ˆ Lqwr] ≥ E[ˆ Lwr],
which completes the proof. ¥





ρr ρu var (re
t)v a r ( ut)




36Table 2: Statistics and Optimal Policy Rules
Statistics Coefficients of optimal policy rule
V[π]V [ x]V [ i]V [ p]E [ L] p t π t x t x t- 1 i t- 1 i t- 2
Optimal Plan / Optimal Rule
ρ r = 0 ρ u = 0 0.157 10.215 0.983 0.938 0.883 -- 0.641 0.325 -0.325 2.163 -1.010
ρ u = 0.35 0.192 10.994 0.983 0.951 0.956 -- 0.641 0.325 -0.325 2.163 -1.010
ρ u = 0.9 0.195 20.057 0.983 1.098 1.397 -- 0.641 0.325 -0.325 2.163 -1.010
ρ r = 0.35 ρ u = 0 0.217 11.056 1.922 2.727 1.206 -- 0.641 0.325 -0.325 2.163 -1.010
ρ u = 0.35 0.252 11.835 1.922 2.740 1.279 -- 0.641 0.325 -0.325 2.163 -1.010
ρ u = 0.9 0.255 20.898 1.922 2.887 1.720 -- 0.641 0.325 -0.325 2.163 -1.010
ρ r = 0.9 ρ u = 0 0.487 5.196 6.765 46.597 2.337 -- 0.641 0.325 -0.325 2.163 -1.010
ρ u = 0.35 0.522 5.975 6.765 46.610 2.410 -- 0.641 0.325 -0.325 2.163 -1.010
ρ u = 0.9 0.525 15.038 6.766 46.757 2.851 -- 0.641 0.325 -0.325 2.163 -1.010
Optimal Non-Inertial Plan / Optimal Taylor Rules
ρ r = 0 ρ u = 0 0.269 13.495 2.030 1.680 1.401 -- 0.641 0.325 -- -- --
ρ u = 0.35 0.391 13.957 2.233 4.224 1.593 -- 1.291 0.263 -- -- --
ρ u = 0.9 0.144 30.354 2.159 3.217 2.122 -- 3.658 0.038 -- -- --
ρ r = 0.35 ρ u = 0 0.358 9.989 6.747 3.631 2.435 -- 0.888 0.694 -- -- --
ρ u = 0.35 0.479 10.451 6.949 6.175 2.627 -- 1.724 0.572 -- -- --
ρ u = 0.9 0.233 26.848 6.876 5.168 3.156 -- 5.041 0.089 -- -- --
ρ r = 0.9 ρ u = 0 0.500 0.529 10.437 39.175 2.993 -- -1.743 -3.222 -- -- --
ρ u = 0.35 0.622 0.991 10.640 41.719 3.185 -- -2.575 -2.495 -- -- --
ρ u = 0.9 0.375 17.388 10.566 40.712 3.714 -- -5.108 -0.283 -- -- --
Optimal Wicksellian Rules
ρ r = 0 ρ u = 0 0.122 13.923 1.237 0.008 1.087 1.997 -- 0.182 -- -- --
ρ u = 0.35 0.146 15.191 1.294 0.015 1.186 1.383 -- 0.228 -- -- --
ρ u = 0.9 0.142 24.466 1.391 0.090 1.653 0.853 -- 0.274 -- -- --
ρ r = 0.35 ρ u = 0 0.149 15.898 2.646 0.013 1.543 2.872 -- 0.139 -- -- --
ρ u = 0.35 0.161 17.597 2.778 0.018 1.669 2.338 -- 0.201 -- -- --
ρ u = 0.9 0.096 28.790 2.761 0.012 2.140 3.323 -- 0.140 -- -- --
ρ r = 0.9 ρ u = 0 0.158 7.072 10.459 0.089 2.973 2.613 -- 0.134 -- -- --
ρ u = 0.35 0.166 8.239 10.699 0.102 3.093 2.426 -- 0.241 -- -- --
ρ u = 0.9 0.110 18.822 10.779 0.094 3.567 2.626 -- 0.259 -- -- --
Estimated  Historical Rule
ρ r = 0 ρ u = 0 0.178 10.531 1.313 0.833 0.997 -- 0.424 0.297 -0.032 1.160 -0.430
ρ u = 0.35 0.330 10.639 1.351 3.586 1.164 -- 0.424 0.297 -0.032 1.160 -0.430
ρ u = 0.9 5.182 13.019 5.078 555.455 7.012 -- 0.424 0.297 -0.032 1.160 -0.430
ρ r = 0.35 ρ u = 0 0.215 11.941 2.961 1.218 1.492 -- 0.424 0.297 -0.032 1.160 -0.430
ρ u = 0.35 0.367 12.049 2.999 3.972 1.659 -- 0.424 0.297 -0.032 1.160 -0.430
ρ u = 0.9 5.219 14.429 6.726 555.841 7.507 -- 0.424 0.297 -0.032 1.160 -0.430
ρ r = 0.9 ρ u = 0 3.080 9.485 21.954 317.172 8.728 -- 0.424 0.297 -0.032 1.160 -0.430
ρ u = 0.35 3.232 9.592 21.993 319.926 8.895 -- 0.424 0.297 -0.032 1.160 -0.430
ρ u = 0.9 8.084 11.973 25.719 871.794 14.743 -- 0.424 0.297 -0.032 1.160 -0.430
Notes: The gray cases indicate that the policy rule results in an indeterminate equilibrium
The estimated historical rule refers to Judd and Rudebusch (1998).Table 3: Statistics and Quasi-Optimal Policy Rules
Statistics Coefficients of optimal policy rule
V[π]V [ x]V [ i]V [ p]E [ L] p t π t x t x t-1 i t-1 i t-2
Quasi-Optimal Rule (p)
ρ r = 0 ρ u = 0 0.128 10.214 1.222 0.011 0.911 0.641 -- 0.325 -- 1.000 --
ρ u = 0.35 0.163 10.995 1.222 0.024 0.984 0.641 -- 0.325 -- 1.000 --
ρ u = 0.9 0.164 20.097 1.223 0.171 1.425 0.641 -- 0.325 -- 1.000 --
ρ r = 0.35 ρ u = 0 0.146 11.025 2.527 0.015 1.276 0.641 -- 0.325 -- 1.000 --
ρ u = 0.35 0.181 11.806 2.528 0.028 1.349 0.641 -- 0.325 -- 1.000 --
ρ u = 0.9 0.182 20.907 2.528 0.175 1.790 0.641 -- 0.325 -- 1.000 --
ρ r = 0.9 ρ u = 0 0.134 4.898 10.069 0.018 2.751 0.641 -- 0.325 -- 1.000 --
ρ u = 0.35 0.170 5.679 10.069 0.030 2.824 0.641 -- 0.325 -- 1.000 --
ρ u = 0.9 0.171 14.780 10.069 0.177 3.265 0.641 -- 0.325 -- 1.000 --
Quasi-Optimal Rule (π)
ρ r = 0 ρ u = 0 0.179 9.923 1.089 1.138 0.916 -- 0.641 0.325 -- 1.000 --
ρ u = 0.35 0.293 10.151 1.123 2.987 1.049 -- 0.641 0.325 -- 1.000 --
ρ u = 0.9 1.848 15.403 2.346 181.241 3.147 -- 0.641 0.325 -- 1.000 --
ρ r = 0.35 ρ u = 0 0.215 10.964 2.137 1.979 1.250 -- 0.641 0.325 -- 1.000 --
ρ u = 0.35 0.329 11.192 2.171 3.828 1.383 -- 0.641 0.325 -- 1.000 --
ρ u = 0.9 1.885 16.444 3.394 182.082 3.482 -- 0.641 0.325 -- 1.000 --
ρ r = 0.9 ρ u = 0 0.234 5.354 8.871 6.154 2.590 -- 0.641 0.325 -- 1.000 --
ρ u = 0.35 0.348 5.582 8.905 8.003 2.723 -- 0.641 0.325 -- 1.000 --




























Figure 1: Optimal Taylor rules for diﬀerent degrees of shock persistence (ρr;ρu)
Notes: Each × denotes an optimal pair of Taylor-rule coeﬃcients (ψπ,ψx) for degrees of serial
correlation of the exogenous shocks given by (ρr;ρu) and indicated in the ﬁgure. The optimal
policy coeﬃcients are computed using (A.55)—(A.56). Taylor rules in the gray region result in an
indeterminate equilibrium.







































Figure 2: Impulse responses to an innovation in re with autocorrelation of ￿r = 0:
Notes: The responses of ^ {t and ^ ￿t are multiplied by 4 so that the responses of all variables are
reported in annual terms.








































Figure 3: Impulse responses to an innovation in u with autocorrelation of ￿u = 0:
Notes: The responses of ^ {t and ^ ￿t are multiplied by 4 so that the responses of all variables are
reported in annual terms.



































Quasi opt. rule (p)
Quasi opt. rule (π)
Figure 4: Welfare losses of alternative policy rules as a function of shock persistence.
Notes: Each curve plots the welfare losses E[L] implied by a particular policy rule for diﬀerent
degrees of serial correlation in the shock processes (ρr = ρu = ρ). The Taylor and Wicksellian rules
are optimized assuming the benchmark shock persistence of ρ =0 .35. The quasi optimal rule (p)




















Quasi opt. rule (p)















Quasi opt. rule (p)













Serial correlation of shocks
V[i]
Figure 5: Volatility of key variables under alternative rules, as a function of shock persistence.
Notes: Each curve plots the volatility measures V[π], V[x], and V[i] implied by a particular
policy rule for diﬀerent degrees of serial correlation in the shock processes (ρr = ρu = ρ). The
Taylor and Wicksellian rules are optimized assuming the benchmark shock persistence of ρ =0 .35.
The quasi optimal rule (p) is given in (40) while the quasi optimal rule (π) is given in (41).































Figure 6: Optimal Wicksellian rules for diﬀerent degrees of shock persistence (ρr;ρu).





serial correlation of the exogenous shocks given by (ρr;ρu) and indicated in the ﬁgure.
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